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ters 4 and 5, I single out the one against logical determinism, or fatalism. 
The topic has been much written about, often enough in terms of 
Aristotle's famous discussion of "the sea battle tomorrow" in De 
Illterpretatione, which is also Felt's point of departure (pp. 41-42). He 
brings this difficult matter as close to his readers as it can be brought in 
so short a book: there are many concrete examples, and they are happily 
woven into the argument. The argument itself turns on (a) four asser-
tions about truth and the future (pp. 43, 47, 49, 53) and (b) three princi-
ples of being and becoming (pp. 56-57). 
The positive-as distinct from critical-part of Felt's book is a doc-
trine of causality designed to show that the agent's freedom consists in 
an exercise of causality rather than in the absence of causality (chaps. 6, 
7, 9). The three principles just mentioned are central to that doctrine, so I 
give here the simplified version of them Felt gives in chapter 9: "(A) The 
past is definite and settled .... (B) The present creates the definiteness of new set-
tled actuality out of a width of possibility for incorporating the past .... (C) 
Only the activity of real agents creates the definiteness of settled actuality" (pp. 
101-2). Felt's use of the principles depends upon the distinction he 
makes, in chapter 6, between subject-time, the time experienced by 
agents, and object-time, the time of the physicist. This chapter owes 
something to St. Augustine and something to Bergson. The free causality 
of agency, Felt says, has the same temporal structure as that of lived 
time, or subject-time: it "takes time but is not itself temporally divisible" 
(p. 84). What Felt calls subject-time I prefer to call act-temporality and to 
insist on a metaphorical applicability of such temporality to the causality 
operative in nature in general. I do not think Felt would disagree with 
that, but the expression 'subject-time' suggests a more radical cleft 
between the causality of agents and the causality of the rest of nature 
than I think he has in mind. But this is perhaps no more than a termino-
logical disagreement. As one who has argued, over many years, that if 
we are to understand human nature we must develop a more ample 
doctrine of causality, one in which human action itself is exemplary, I 
welcome the appearance of this compact and accessible book. An earlier 
version of chapter 8, "Becoming, Freedom, and the Problem of Evil," 
appeared in this journal (I [1984], 370-77). 
The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, by John Martin Fischer. 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994. Pp ix and 273. $21.95. 
TED A. WARFIELD, University of Notre Dame 
John Fischer has been an active participant in discussions of freedom, 
determinism, foreknowledge, and moral responsibility for nearly two 
decades. Fischer's articles and anthologies on freedom and determin-
ism, freedom and foreknowledge, and moral responsibility are a tremen-
dous resource to philosophers working on these topics. In this wide-
ranging and clearly written book, Fischer adds to this already impres-
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sive body of work. The book is essential reading to philosophers work-
ing on any aspect of free will or moral responsibility. 
I cannot hope to discuss every topic covered in Fischer's book, so I 
will discuss what I take to be some of its more problematic features 
beginning with Fischer's original and important discussion of moral 
responsibility. 
Many philosophers have worried that determinism, if true, threatens 
moral responsibility. Here is one way of articulating this worry. 
Determinism seems to imply that if S does A, then there were no alterna-
tive possibilities open to S, and it is plausible to think that S is morally 
responsible for doing A only if there were alternative possibilities open 
to S. So it is plausible to think that determinism is incompatible with 
moral responsibility. 
In his well-known paper" Alternative Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility," Harry Frankfurt challenged the claim that alternative 
possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility.\ .. Here is one Frankfurt 
style case. Jill decides on her own to steal a book from the library and she 
does so knowing full well that stealing is wrong. Unbeknownst to Jill, 
had she shown any inclination at all to refrain from stealing the book, 
Jack would have intervened and forced her (employing a credible threat 
to her life) to steal the book. But Jack did not force Jill's hand; Jill stole 
the book on her own. Many have thought that cases like this are cases of 
moral responsibility without alternative possibilities. 
One response to Frankfurt cases is what Fischer calls the "flicker of 
freedom" response. This response accepts that agents in Frankfurt cases 
are morally responsible but denies that there are no alternative possibili-
ties in the cases. For example, the flicker strategist might claim that 
though Jill is morally responsible for her actions, it was open to Jill to 
decide not to steal the book. Of course, had Jill done this, Jack would 
have forced her to steal the book. The point, though, is that this alterna-
tive possible course of events represents a genuine alternative possibility 
to the actual series of events. So, according to the flicker theorist, the 
Jack / Jill case is not a counterexample to the claim that alternative pos-
sibilities are necessary for moral responsibility.2 
Fischer enters the debate at this point with an interesting suggestion: 
"I am willing to grant to the flicker theorist the claim that there exists an 
alternative possibility here; but my basic worry is that this alternative 
possibility is not sufficiently robust to ground the relevant attributions of 
moral responsibility." (140) Fischer's claim is interesting and potentially 
important to discussions of the nature of moral responsibility. But in the 
present context, as I will explain, it is hard to see why Fischer even 
thinks that this claim is relevant. 
After some discussion of the claim quoted above, Fischer notes that 
he sees no reason to accept that it is in virtue of the alternative possibili-
ties present in Frankfurt cases (or other conditions necessary for the 
presence of the alternative possibilities) that agents in Frankfurt cases 
are morally responsible. Fischer then declares that we have reached a 
"Dialectical Stalemate" -a situation "common in philosophy" in which 
one side (Frankfurt's, according to Fischer) has fallen "just short" of 
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establishing its position and it is hard to see how further non-question 
begging progress can be made. 
Whatever one thinks of Fischer's metaphilosophical views, I think 
Fischer is wrong to claim that the present debate, at least as he presents 
it, has reached a Dialectical Stalemate. Frankfurt hoped to show that 
even if determinism rules out alternative possibilities, this does not auto-
matically rule out moral responsibility. And Frankfurt, at least as por-
trayed by Fischer, hoped to show this by providing counterexamples to 
the claim that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. On 
Fischer's diagnosis, flicker theorists show that Frankfurt cases involve 
alternative possibilities and so are not successful counterexamples. I see 
no stalemate here; if Fischer's analysis is correct, the flicker theorists 
have decisively won this debate. 
Fischer seems to think that rebutting Frankfurt is not enough for the 
flicker theorists: 
"[I]t is not enough for the flicker theorist ... to identify an alternative 
possibility. Although this is surely a first step, it is not enough to estab-
lish the flicker of freedom view, because what needs also to be shown is 
that these alternative possibilities ... ground our attributions of moral 
responsibility." (140) But the flicker of freedom response is nothing more 
than a response to Frankfurt. One wanting to respond to Frankfurt 
needn't go on to do any of the things Fischer claims the flicker theorist 
must. So while Fischer's claims and arguments about what grounds 
moral responsibility are interesting and potentially important, it is mis-
guided to think that these claims support Frankfurt. 
Let me now tum to one puzzling part of Fischer's discussion of argu-
ments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Such argu-
ments typically employ what Fischer calls a transfer principle. One 
plausible transfer principle states that "If S has no choice about P, and Q 
is a logical consequence of P, then S has no choice about Q." Fischer 
wonders if plausible incompatibilist arguments must employ a transfer 
principle. Fischer argues that this is not the case by formulating an 
incompatibilist argument that does not explicitly rely on a transfer prin-
ciple and then challenging incompatibilists to show that the argument 
somehow implicitly relies on one. 
Unfortunately for Fischer, an incompatibilist needn't respond in this 
way, for Fischer presents a formally invalid argument and therefore does 
not offer a plausible non-transfer incompatibilist argument. Fischer admits, 
in a note, that his argument is invalid but says that nonetheless he 
"believe[s] that it is reasonable to accept its conclusion, given both its formal 
structure and the content of its premises" (228). I can make no sense of this 
claim.3 .If Fischer wishes to argue that incompatibilists needn't rely on any 
transfer principle, he would be well advised to offer a formally valid incom-
patibilist argument as evidence of this (the issue of whether the argument 
somehow presupposes a transfer principle would of course remain). 
Fischer's admission that this central argument of Chapter Three is 
invalid is not the only case in which Fischer's notes seem to reveal that 
Fischer is aware of important difficulties for his central claims. I will 
briefly mention two further examples of this. 
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In Chapter Eight, Fischer begins to develop a sophisticated and novel 
account of moral responsibility. The punch line of Fischer's analysis is 
that weak reasons-responsiveness is sufficient for moral responsibility, 
where an action is weakly reasons-responsive just in case there exists a 
"possible world in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the 
agent's actual mechanism operates, and the agent does otherwise" (166). 
In note 8, however, Fischer admits that this account incorrectly implies 
that an insane killer whose mechanism is responsive only to bizarre (yet 
sufficient) reasons for not killing is morally responsible. Fischer admits 
that his account is refuted by the counterexample but says little more 
than that the account "needs to be refined" and that he does "not think 
the revision will be radical"(243).4 
Similarly disappointing is Fischer's choice of opponents in Chapter 
Two which assesses two challenges to incompatibilist transfer princi-
ples. Fischer discusses only weak challenges from Michael Slote and 
Anthony Kenny, neither of which directly addresses the critical transfer 
principles for power necessity. Fischer is well aware, as evidenced by 
note 31 of the chapter, of more serious challenges to incompatibilist 
transfer principles from philosophers including David Widerker, Linda 
Zagzebski, and Kadri Vihvelin, but he does not discuss this important 
body of literature. 
Before concluding, I should say something to readers of this journal 
who may be primarily or exclusively interested in the issue of human 
freedom and divine foreknowledge. The focus of this book is on causal 
determinism, so while Fischer certainly devotes a healthy number of 
pages to discussing the foreknowledge debate, most are spent develop-
ing parallels between foreknowledge and causal determinism. Not 
much space is devoted to the special intricacies of the foreknowledge 
debate, the exception being Fischer's helpful discussion of hard and soft 
facts which makes several original points and includes a response to 
critics of further inquiry into the nature of this extremely complex dis-
tinction. Readers interested exclusively in the foreknowledge problem 
can certainly skip several chapters of Fischer's book, but cannot afford to 
ignore the entire book. 
Let me close by stressing that I have focused on what I take to be 
some of the weaknesses of Fischer's fine book. On the whole the book is 
closely argued, well written and is mandatory reading for metaphysi-
cians concerned with the will. 5 
NOTES 
1. Journal of Philosophy 66 (December 1969), 829-839. 
2. A second reading of Frankfurt style cases is that they are counterex-
amples to the claim that morally responsibility for P requires alternative pos-
sibilities to P. On this reading, the Frankfurtian would claim that though 
there are alternative possibilities present in the Jack / Jill case, Jill is respon-
sible for stealing the book even though there were no open alternative possi-
bilities to her doing so. This suggests that even if determinism rules out 
alternative possibilities to the actions one performs, one might still be moral-
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ly responsible for the actions. The standard anti-Frankfurtian reply is to 
deny that Jill is responsible for stealing the book and instead claim that she 
is responsible for stealing it on her own and that there were open alternatives 
to this action. 
3. Professor Fischer informs me that he explains and defends his claim 
further in "Free Will and the Modal Principle," Philosophical Studies, forth-
coming. 
4. In Responsibility and Freedom: An Essay on Control, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1996) Fischer and Mark Ravizza 
discuss and defend this account of moral responsibility. 
5. Thanks to Peter van Inwagen, Tim O'Connor, Chris Hill, Alicia Finch 
and Gordon Pettit for helpful discussion of Fischer's book. 
Is Christianity True?, by Hugo A. Meynell. Washington, DC, The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1994. Pp.ix and 149. $24.95 (Cloth); $14.95 
(Paper). 
DAVID B. BURRELL, C.s.c., University of Notre Dame 
The author exhibits his skill in issues connected with philosophy of reli-
gion to test out a clear intention: "that the Christian has good reason for 
believing what she characteristically believes"(I). He is not directly con-
cerned with "what is for many people the crucial issue, belief that there is 
a God"(2), because he had already dealt with that issue in a book pub-
lished in 1982: The Intelligible Universe. The topics he covers, in order, are 
(1) the sufficiency (or not) of secular morality, (2) other religions, (3) 
incarnation and atonement, (4) historical criticism of the bible, (5) divine 
triunity, and (6) "life after death." I mention these topics since the argu-
ment of the book is inevitably topical and at root rhetorical, since criteria 
for "good reasons" are notoriously difficult to delineate. He does want to 
undertake the task, however, rather than rest with accepting belief in 
God as "properly basic," since he does not accept counsels of despair 
regarding ways of determining "which beliefs are rational"(3), or at least 
more rational than others. Indeed, he contends "that the most cogent rea-
son for believing in the existence of a God is the openness of the universe 
to investigation by the human mind"(3)-the burden of the earlier book. 
But finding reasons for believing in a God, and finding commensu-
rate reasons for believing what Christians believe are two quite distinct 
endeavors. And the latter, which organizes this work, is of necessity 
even more diffuse and rhetorical in character than the first. For one 
thing, what are to count as "good reasons" seem quite contingent, and 
hence nearly totally dependent on the attractiveness of the presentation 
to someone for whom the journey of faith may not previously have been 
an option. Nor is there a canonical set of topics available, which 
accounts for the diversity of approach which such endeavors might take. 
Meynell's approach will probably strike most readers as "old-fash-
ioned," both in the topics proposed and the manner of dealing with 
them. The most arresting chapter in the book (to this reviewer) was the 
